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Contemporary Painting Theory 
One peculiar feature of the Anglo-American reception of 
French thought since about r970 is the view that the variety 
of thinkers and tendencies involved reduces everything to 
language. One crucial place to test such a reading is with re-
gard to a set of texts devoted to painting and the visual arts, 
for the latter would seem to be situated at or beyond the 
boundaries of language, a place that Julia Kristeva calls the 
semiotic. The alleged reductionism of the French is usually 
construed as the claim that language is a seamless whole in 
which all meanings are defined in terms of one another. But 
it is characteristic of French poststructuralist thinkers to 
deny precisely this view, and to emphasize the fissures and 
fractures in linguistic systems, their susceptibility to psy-
chological, social, or institutional power, and their tendency 
to generate inconsistencies and aporias. So even if the al-
leged reduction were to occur, it would be to a language that 
was already understood in what might be called a "material-
istic" fashion. On the other hand, if language is construed 
more narrowly and conventionally as verbal, then the lead-
ing tendency among poststructuralist thinkers would seem 
to be the desire to distinguish benveen the linguistic and the 
visual while at the same time tracking and articulating the 
structure and play of their incursions into and intersections 
with one another. In this respect Jacques Derrida speaks for 
these theorists when he suggests (in The Truth in Painting) 
that we should question the traditional philosophical hierar-
chy or system of the arts, according to which it is the arts of 
language to which the others aspire and which complete 
their mission (the traditional view is found to be especially 
strong in G. W. F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger). Given this 
approach, it becomes an important task for poststructuralist 
thinkers to be self-critically vigilant about the position of 
the speaker or writer who addresses painting. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty, the most im-
mediate French target of poststructuralist critiques of phe-
nomenology, develops a parallel het\veen the work of the 
phenomenologist and the painter (he differs here from his 
contemporary Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom the artist pro-
duces images that are capable of phenomenological analy-
sis; for Sartre it is the writer of philosophy or prose who can 
disclose the truth of consciousness). At first this parallel 
seems to respect the differences between the visual and the 
discursive, with painter and philosopher \rnrking in quite 
distinct and equally significant media. In "Cezanne's 
Doubt" Merleau-Ponty sees Paul Cezanne's project not in 
terms of the finished products of his work (indeed, Cezanne 
denied that most of his paintings were finished, and refused 
to sign them), but as a continually renewed effort to work 
back to the primordial roots of perception. Just as Edmund 
Husserl found the articulation of the levels of intentionality 
that structure all experience an endless task, so Cezanne, on 
this view, kept going back beyond the easy abstractions of 
convention and tradition in order to disclose the nature of 
vision. For the painter this entailed a questiomng of the 
residues of quattrocento perspectivism, according to which 
the world is seen by a monocular, immobile gaze that tran-
scends the field it dominates. It also entailed Cezanne's 
parting ways with the impressionists, rejecting the1r dissolu-
tion of everything into light; he insisted on the obstmacy of 
the object. Implicit in Cezanne's stylistic development is a 
refusal to divorce sight from touch or from the temporal ex-
perience in which vision is always more than a momentary 
impression; it is the latter that should be considered an ab-
straction, rather than considering the object as a mere con-
struct. 
In this portrait of Cezanne Merleau-Ponty relies rather 
heavily on the painter's reported conversation and the liter-
ary testimonies of his contemporaries. Because Cezanne 
was reported to have said that he submitted himself to the 
pater omnipotens, Merleau-Ponty mfers that he was "ori-
ented to an infinite Logos" (Merleau-Ponty, 1993). In order 
to make Cezanne's paintings speak, the philosopher has re-
course to the painter's speech, so that language seems to be 
the court of last resort. Especially since Merleau-Ponty's 
use of the written sources is rather uncritical, there seems to 
be an implicit priority given to the linguistic that produces 
unacknowledged consequences for the analysis of painting. 
This apparent priority of the linguistic takes a more ex-
plicit form in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Si-
lence," an essay inspired by Andre Malraux's [{nces of Si-
lence. As the latter title indicates, the question is \Vhether and 
how one can speak for the visual, which seems to have no 
voice of its own. Merleau-Ponty sees Malraux as submitting 
visual art to the monstrous order of Hegelian history, ac-
cording to which it is later works, as understood and articu-
lated by the critic, that put us in a position to assess earlier 
ones. The museum, with or without walls, and its associated 
practices and discourses are said to overwhelm the style or 
"inner schema" that constitutes the artist's "life itself." So 
far Merleau-Ponty contrasts a primordial phenomenology 
of the artist's activity with a discourse that can only be sec-
ondary and external to it. The extreme expression of such a 
position is found in the late "Eye and Jv1ind," where 1t is said 
the \·ery first painting went to the farthest reaches of the fu-
ture, implying that each painting involves an "advent" of 
meaning that can never he exhausted. "Indirect Language" 
begins by appealing tLl Ferdinand de Saussure's diacritical 
account of language to suggest that all meaning lies in the 
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interstices; in Merleau-Ponty's analysis this applies to visual 
art as well as to language in the narrower sense, so that the 
latter would have no priority over the former. Yet the essay 
ends with a kind of reformed Hegelianism, setting out a se-
ries of distinctions between painting and writing that hinge 
on painting's failure to achieve presence: "The Spirit of 
Painting appears only in the Museum, because it is a spirit 
external to itself. . . . Man does not paint paintings, but he 
speaks about speech, and the spirit oflanguage wants to de-
pend upon nothing but itself." Art seems to become more 
truthful, more fully present, as it approaches the condition 
of language. Literature of any time is said to live "entirely in 
the present" whereas paintings date much more easily. What 
emerges from these dubious contrasts is a traditional com-
mitment that undermines Merleau-Ponty's desire to pro-
vide a phenomenological recognition of the autonomy of 
painting. Merleau-Ponty's late and unfinished The Visible 
and the Invisible is tantalizingly suggestive; it introduces the 
idea of a hyperreflection (sur-refiexion) that seems to hover 
on a boundary between the perceptual and the linguistic 
and that 
would set itself the task of . . . reflecting on the transcendence 
of the world as transcendence, speaking of it not according to 
the law of the word-meanings inherent in the given language, 
but with a perhaps difficult effort that uses the signification of 
words to express, beyond themselves, our mute contact with the 
things, when they are not yet said. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968) 
Although Merleau-Ponty was not able to develop this him-
self with respect to articulating the relation between lan-
guage and painting, it could be taken as a motto for much of 
the succeeding work in this intellectual tradition. The Visible 
and the Invisible is also notable for the thesis that the relation 
between human vision and the world is chiasmic; that is, our 
seeing is possible only insofar as the world is a kind of ex-
tended "flesh" that in some sense sees us. This thesis, remi-
niscent to some degree of Friedrich von Schelling's absolute 
idealism and philosophy of nature, was taken up by Jacques 
Lacan, who suggested that there is "a pre-existence of the 
gaze-I see only from one point, but in my existence I am 
looked at from all sides" (Lacan, 1978, p. 72). This gaze is 
associated with castration anxiety; it is an "evil eye" that dis-
closes the inadequacies of the viewer. For Lacan our modes 
of dealing with the world are either in the imaginary mode, 
based on our recognition and misrecognition of ourselves in 
the mirror stage, or in the symbolic or linguistic register, in 
which language seems to form a relatively seamless set of 
signifiers by which we glide from one meaning to another. 
The visual can function as a disruption or interruption of 
the symbolic, making us aware of the limitations of lan-
guage; and within the visual the phenomenon of distortion, 
or specifically anamorphosis, which Lacan analyzes in Hans 
Holbein's painting The Ambassadors, can serve to disturb the 
illusory integrity of the imaginary. In Holbein's painting the 
anamorphic skull stares back at us, challenging the assumed 
autonomy of our gaze and marking the inevitability of loss 
and death. Effects like this are "stains" on the imaginary 
wholeness of the visual field. Despite his famous insistence 
that "the unconscious is structured like a language," then, 
Lacan arrives at a position similar in some respects to that 
ofJean-Frarn;:ois Lyotard, who accuses him of a form oflin·· 
guistic reductionism (at least in Lacan's alleged omission of 
the visual dimension of the dream); given their common 
debt to Merleau-Ponty, this partial overlap is not as surpris-
ing as it might initially appear. 
Michel Foucault. Foucault's The Order of Things:An Ar-
chaeology of the Human Sciences begins with a celebrated dis-
cussion of Diego Rodriguez de Silva y Velazquez's Las 
Meninas, which inserts the painting into history (or reads it 
archaeologically, to preserve the author's language) by sug-
gesting that the position that the painting allocates to its 
artist, model, and spectator is one that is occupied in oscil-
lating fashion by each, but that these roles must fail to coin-
cide. This is taken to be an indication that the epoch of 
which the painting is typical does not yet have a conception 
of human beings as self-knowing subjects, one that would 
be the ground of all other knowledge. While some have 
criticized the essay for carelessness in understanding 
Velazquez's use of perspective (and these criticisms seem 
rather hasty), we might attend to another dimension of the 
text in which it explores the relation between painting and 
language. The "starting point for speech," Foucault writes, 
is the incompatibility of language and the visible. Las Meni-
nas can be read either as a simple group portrait or as a 
highly self-referential work involving a complex reflection 
on the conditions of pictorial representation; similarly, Fou-
cault's essay can be read either as a commentary on the 
painting (the level at which questions about matters such as 
perspective would arise) or as an artful meditation on the 
relations between painting and language. Consider the 
question of who is marking the failed coincidence of artist, 
model, and spectator or the absence of a human being; Fou-
cault insinuates a voice in the first person plural, a "we" that 
manages a virtual incorporation of its readers. If "we do not 
know who we are" insofar as we occupy the position of the 
spectator/artist/model in front of the visible painting, no 
such uncertainty infects us in our role as the collective sub-
ject who observes and records such uncertainties or ambi-
guities. If the figures depicted in or implied by the painting 
are frozen in time, "we" are involved in a process of discov-
ery that unfolds through Foucault's narrative. Much later in 
The Order of Things, when Foucault is explaining the rise 
and disappearance of the concept of the human being, he 
refers once more to the discussion of Las Meninas, pointing 
out that it was precisely that concept ("enslaved sovereign, 
observed subject") that was lacking in the painting. He 
broaches the possibility of imagining a different version of 
the work in which the various roles sketched earlier coin-
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cide, and in a highly impersonal way recalls that earlier "one 
imagined" the figures in restless oscillation. Now the collec-
tive subject has disappeared. In each case Foucault's 
rhetoric is appropriate. In the opening essay the linguistic 
"we" marks a distinction between a speech that can assume 
concepts not open to its object, while in the later reference 
to the painting, since it is now the concept of the human 
that is being articulated and questioned, a different voice, 
one no longer rooted in the "we" takes over. Indeed, some-
thing like this shift had already occurred between the two 
parts of the opening essay, for the second part begins by ex-
plicitly noting the different registers of the linguistic and the 
visual; neither can be reduced to the other. Yet even this 
must be placed within a historical (or archaeological) con-
text. This becomes clear in Foucault's essay on Rene 
Magritte, This Is Not a Pipe, in which he argues that paint-
ing has overcome the code, traditional at least since the 
fourteenth century, that prohibited interchanges between 
the linguistic and the visual. There he complicates the genre 
of ekphrasis, the verbal description of a visual work, by writ-
ing of a painting that, on his reading, has already entered 
into the linguistic realm. 
Jacques Derrida. Perhaps with a nod to Merleau-
Ponty, Derrida begins The Truth in Painting by citing a line 
from Cezanne: "I owe you the truth in painting and I will 
tell it to you" (Derrida, 1987). Derrida's commentary on 
this phrase, given directly in an introductory essay and indi-
rectly throughout the book, takes the form of a series of 
meditations on how it is possible to speak, truthfully or ade-
quately, of that which is silent. Derrida expects us to be fa-
miliar with what he refers to as "the canonical difficulties of 
description in discourse on art," which have to do, presum-
ably, with the difference between visual and verbal media. 
The pitfall in speaking or writing about visual art seems to 
consist in forcing its translation into language and overlook-
ing its specific character as painting. This danger is ana-
lyzed in the book's longest essay, offering an analysis of the 
difference between the philosopher Martin Heidegger and 
the art historian Meyer Schapiro with regard to the under-
standing of a Vincent van Gogh painting of old shoes. Hei-
degger had invoked the painting in "The Origin of the Work 
of Art (1936)," both to demonstrate something about the 
nature of equipment (such as shoes) and to show how art 
could be truthful. For Heidegger, the shoes disclose the 
world and earth of the peasant woman to whom he imag-
ines that they belong; and insofar as art discloses something 
about equipment, which supposes both a world of mean-
ings and a resisting element (earth), \Vith which the world is 
in tension, it is truthful. Heidegger describes this illumina-
tion by saying "this painting has spoken," a phrase that Der-
rida takes quite seriously as indicating the point made more 
explicitly later in Heidegger's essay that the art of language 
somehow embraces and surpasses the other arts. Schapiro, 
on the other hand, had argued on biographical grounds that 
these were the shoes of van Gogh, an artist and a man of the 
city. In a complex dialogue (or polylogue), Derrida deploys 
a number of voices who offer an analysis of the "correspon-
dence" between the t\vo interpreters of the painung. The di-
alogue suggests that the t\vo are as one in their assumption 
of the project of appropriating the painting by means of lan-
guage. To say that the shoes belong to the peasant woman 
(or artist) is to say something like "they belong to me, the 
interpreter." The linguistic project proceeds by finding fa-
miliar categories of meaning: a pair of shoes, an absent 
owner. But the several voices of the dialogue-pluralized so 
as to avoid the illusion of a single magisterial speaker-ask 
whether the shoes are really a pair (they could be two left 
shoes) and whether they must be thought of m relation to 
an owner (why do they stand there empty and very promi-
nently unlaced?). As one voice suggests, the shoes are, in 
some sense, on the other side of language: "they concern 
us/look at us, mouth agape, that 1s, mute, makmg or letting 
us chatter on, dumbstruck before those who make them 
speak . . . and who in reality are made to speak by them." 
This suggestion has a psychoanalytic flavor: we are com-
pelled to speak of painting, we may have an obsessive desire 
to do so, but if we fail to acknowledge and thematize that 
desire, then we become its plaything and are able to speak 
only of ourselves. Therapy would itself be verbal, although 
conducted without a magisterial speaker, and would consist 
in accepting the detachment of the work (for which the de-
tached state of the shoes is a metaphor). Derrida is also 
wary of one tempting but false exit from the verbal/visual 
complex: this would be to fetishize the very silence of the 
work in such a way as to give it a kind of aphoristic author-
ity, to endow it with a virtual and unquestionable discourse 
(see especially his interview with Peter Brunette and David 
\'Vills in Deconstruction and the Visual Arts). Strategies other 
than the dialogue are possible to avoid the t\vo extremes. In 
Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, Der-
rida, responding to an unnamed interlocutor, explores the 
possibility of assuming explicitly one's own speaking posi-
tion in all its fallibility and with all its limits. He attempts to 
show that the one who dra\vs or pamts does not see the sub-
ject (e.g., the model) in the very act or moment of marking 
the paper or canvas; whence the interest of the iconography 
of blindness and its analogues in the works Derrida selected 
for the exhibition that is the occasion of his essay. \'Vriting 
also involves a certain blindness, a plunging headlong into 
an as yet undefined area. The blind person's cane, the 
artist's brush, the writer's fingers on the keyboard are ana-
logues of one another. There is no all-seeing gaze for the 
same reason that one does not know what will be written 
until one writes it. The conditions of possibility of these ac-
tivities become even more promment in self-portraiture, 
whether visual or verbal. In this particular essay Derrida ex-
plores his mvn opticality, including dream visions, a paraly-
sis of the eye that occurred while writing, and the tears that, 
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he suggests, are the eye's most distinctive and truly human 
activity. The traditional ecphrasis, with its assumption of a 
magisterial viewer and speaker, is replaced by a model of a 
fractured self for whom these activities fail to coincide with 
each other and are split within themselves. The banal fact 
that one cannot write and see at the same time has become 
a way of rendering the genre of ecphrasis problematic, so 
that the writer becomes a "ruin," like the self-portrait. (It is 
perhaps needless to add that many of the analogies piled on 
top of one another here may appear deeply questionable.) 
Roland Barthes. Barthes's pioneering and wide-ranging 
work in literary and cultural semiotics might suggest that he 
applies a specifically linguistic model to all forms of art and 
image making. The analyses collected in his relatively early 
Mythologies, including those of such visual products as mag-
azine advertisements and covers, photographic exhibitions, 
and films, tend to support this view. He also wrote of the 
photograph, however, that it is "a message without a code" 
(Barthes, 1981), suggesting that it cannot yield a specific 
meaning without contextual clues; and he went on to say that 
the image (a general term for any visual artifact, which can be 
profitably compared to Lacan's idea of the picture) is essen-
tially polysemous and that language is needed to limit its in-
definitely proliferating possible meanings. In an essay on the 
artist Cy Twombly, Barthes investigates the reciprocity of 
drawing and written language, pointing out that Twombly's 
drawing is a kind of trace or inscription, a mark of his having 
been there; at the same time the titles of his pieces, while not 
describing in any simple way what they might be thought to 
represent, provoke a certain direction of thought that leads 
us to see their strictly visual content in a more specific way 
than we would otherwise (for example, in terms of a "Medi-
teranean atmosphere"). 
Barthes's most sustained exploration of the relation be-
tween image and language is Camera Lucida, a book about 
photography that involves a meditation on death, geneal-
ogy, and modernity. Artfully designed, the text is punctu-
ated by a series of photographs which illustrate and amplify 
the essay that ostensibly comments on them. Seeming to 
take up the project of phenomenology (dedicating the book 
to Sartre's The Imagination), Barthes first suggests a binary 
distinction for the analysis of photographs. Every photo-
graph has its studium, a topos (e.g., a Russian street scene, 
a body in the road during wartime); but if it is a photograph 
of some real interest it will also have its punctum, some un-
expected, unpredictable detail or mood that troubles, dis-
turbs, or excites us (e.g., a strange cap worn by a Russian 
boy, a sheet carried by a woman at the death scene). The 
punctum can be compared to the role of the stain or 
anamorphosis in Lacan's theory (to which Barthes often al-
ludes), insofar as it interrupts a quasi-linguistic continuum. 
One of Barthes's most striking gestures in Camera Lucida is 
his not reproducing the photograph of his mother as a five-
year-old child on which the later argument of the book 
turns. This absent image intensifies the realization that all 
photographs have a distinctive temporality: they arc marks 
of something that has happened earlier, signifying "that-
has-been," or the tense of the simple past. This mere fact of 
being there in the mode of being related to what was can be 
compared with Heidegger's conception of the artwork as 
simply giving or manifesting itself and with Derrida's at-
tempt to honor the remainder in the visual work, even de-
fending it against Heidegger's lapses; but we should also 
note the contrast between the present tense of the "it gi\·es" 
or "it shows itself" and the past of "that-has-been." Beyond 
that, Barthes suggests, this photograph is emblematic of 
this: insofar as photography is marked by pastness it is akin 
to death and our concern with it can be a mode of mourn-
ing. If the awareness of death is largely repressed in con-
temporary society, the photograph, especially in its stark 
black-and-white form, may be the way in which this re-
pressed element returns. Photography can be tamed, 
Barthes says, by the addition of color, which restores the il-
lusion of life, or by film, which does something similar 
through motion and sound. The nonappearance of the 
mother's photograph might be taken at first to indicate that 
Barthes believes that his writing can provide its equivalent, 
as in the classical poetic and rhetorical genre of ecphrasis. 
But he tells us that the true reason is that the photograph is 
too personal, and too closely tied to that which ultimately 
("nondialectically," he says) individualizes him, his death, 
to have a general meaning; in other words, it is precisely be-
cause the picture escapes the linguistic dimension to an ex-
treme degree that its absence says something about the in-
eluctable inadequacy of language in the face of the 
photographic image. Camera Lucida can also be read as a 
translation of Lacanian concepts to photography, in which, 
for example, Barthes's analysis of death would correspond 
to Lacan's "real." 
Julia Kristeva. Kristeva's early intellectual career owes 
much to the work of Barthes in particular, as well as to the 
general context of French structuralist and poststructuralist 
linguistics, criticism, and philosophy. Some affinities and 
contrasts with Barthes emerge in her major statement con-
cerning visual art, "Motherhood according to Giovanni 
Bellini," for there she is concerned, like her mentor, with the 
way in which the maternal either escapes representation 
and language or interrupts the flow of the symbolic (per-
haps it should be noted that this essay of 1975 predates 
Camera Lucida by several years). Painting occupies a role at 
the edge of the linguistic or symbolic in Kristeva's analysis. 
She is concerned, much in the manner of Lacan, with how 
human beings become "speaking animals." Kristeva argues 
that our initiation into what she calls the "socio-symbolic 
contract" always involves loss or sacrifice of a pre-Oedipal 
bond with the mother; once situated within the symbolic, 
we are caught between two dangers, to which art and litera-
ture can sometimes offer a resistance. We might accept the 
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symbolic without question, as a system for the exchange of 
meaning without affect, in which case we become nothing 
but functionaries of the social norms; or, we might attempt 
(as some radical feminists do, she suggests) to flee the 
symbolic altogether for the sake of a fantasized return to 
the prelinguistic maternal. Yet the symbolic is never all-
powerful; it may be interrupted by what Kristeva calls the 
semiotic, that is, drives, impulses, and feelings that come 
from the maternal, presymbolic level. Art and literature can 
present and frame this interplay of the semiotic and sym-
bolic; in the case of painting it is color and space that can 
break through and question or modify the linguistic and so-
cial norms. Although painting, we might say, is from the 
first nonlinguistic, the symbolic plays a role in it insofar as 
painting has recognizable themes, an iconological vocabu-
lary, and fits into specific social, religious, or philosophical 
traditions that are typically articulated by means of lan-
guage. The return of the semiotic in art, then, is both a way 
of escaping from the tight constraints of the socially and lin-
guistically constructed self and a way of reconstituting that 
self in a less rigid form. As Kristeva says of color, in 
"Giotto's Joy," "it is through color-colors-that the subject 
escapes its alienation within a code (representational, ideo-
logical, symbolic, and so forth) that it, as conscious subject, 
accepts" (Kristeva, 1988, p. 37). The contrast with Barthes, 
who valorizes the contrast black and white, is striking (and 
while it is true that Barthes does this in the rather special 
case of photography, it is also true that he has very little to 
say about color in his other writings on the visual). 
In her essay on Giovanni Bellini, Kristeva turns to the 
theme of the maternal as such. On the basis of rather 
sketchy biographical information, she supposes that Bellini 
lost or was in some way abandoned by his mother, and that 
his work can be read as a search for the lost maternal in its 
semiotic manifestations of color and space. On one level, 
she is offering a parallel and contrast to Sigmund Freud's 
psychoanalytic account of Leonardo da Vinci; but whereas 
Leonardo (for Sigmund Freud) was dealing with too many 
mothers (his birth mother and his stepmother), Bellini was 
attempting to recapture the semiotic equivalent of archaic, 
prelinguistic memory or desire. Another contrast has to do 
with painterly and religious traditions, which form part of 
the symbolic context for both; this is the opposition be-
tween the figurative style of Florentine painting (Leonardo) 
and the colorist mode of the Venetians (Bellini), as well as 
the stronger presence of Eastern Orthodox conceptions of 
the Virgin Mary that, on Kristeva's account, reinforce the 
artistic contrast insofar as Byzantine Christianity is less 
concerned with representing the mother by clearly delin-
eated figures. Unlike Freud, in his writings on visual art, 
Kristeva is relatively unconcerned \Vith iconographic or 
iconological meaning in Bellini's work; rather, she attempts 
to evoke the ways in \Vhich, through a complex series of 
stages constituting a long carccr, he fulfills the role of the 
artist to let the traces of the semiotic break through the lim-
its of the symbolic: "At the intersection of sign and rhythm, 
of representation and light, of the symbolic and the semi-
otic, the artist speaks from a place where she [the mother] is 
not. He delineates what, in her, is a body rejoicing [iouis-
sant]" (Kristeva, 1980, p. 242). For Kristeva, to imagine that 
painting would be reducible to language or the symbolic 
could only be a symptom of the hypertrophy of rationalism 
and idealism; whereas to think that it could be an avenue for 
ecstatic flight into the purely semiotic would be a form of 
regression or madness inconsistent with our destiny as 
"speaking animals." 
Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. At least since Discours, fig-
ure (1971), Lyotard insisted that language is not a self-
sufficient system; it is, he always maintained, constantly dis-
rupted, interrupted, and contested by something else that 
alternately is called presence, figure, or event. If pamting 
cannot be reduced to the word, this provides no foundation 
for a cult of silence around art. Even silence, Lyotard argues 
in The Dzfferend: Phrases in Dispute ( l 988) is a marked posi-
tion within the world in which \Ve speak. There is no escape 
from phrasing or sentence making. Merleau-Ponty's pres-
ence in this early work of Lyotard's is strongly marked, and 
perhaps one can see Discours,figure as a carrying out of the 
hyperref!exion of which the former spoke. In Que peindre? 
Adamz~Arakawa, Buren, Lyotard examines the differend, or 
unresolvable dispute, between those who believe that there 
is nothing in painting that cannot be verbalized and those 
who claim that there is an irreducible level of visual pres-
ence in art. Appropriately enough, the exploration proceeds 
by a series of dialogues that eventually focuses on the prob-
lematic work of the three contemporary artJsts named in the 
book's subtitle. Lyotard sets up the issue in somethmg like 
the following way. "A" claims that whatever is seen m art 
can be described linguistically; rhetorical ecphrasis, art his-
tory, or criticism can evoke images of real or imaginary 
works. If painting is meaningful, then its meaning must be 
linguistically accessible. If someone were to claim that 
something was missing from such linguistic performances, 
then it should be possible to say what it 1s. But as soon as 
such naming occurs, we are on the way to a verbal articula-
tion. But someone else, "B," maintains that reference is not 
reduction, that the ability to speak about painting does not 
imply that there is nothing in the painting that is not trans-
latable into language. B might be suspicious of any com-
mentary that led us to short-circuit our looking. The rush to 
commentary obscures the fact that painting's point may be 
precisely to contest the hegemony of the lmguistic. A replies 
that by valorizing the silence of painting, B actually makes it 
speak after a fashion; the painting is understood as making 
a statement, albeit a self-referential one about its own pow-
ers, status, effects, and integrity. If the work excludes the 
profane speech of the rhetor or critic, then its eloquent si-
lence becomes authoritarian. Lyotard defines the work of 
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philosophy as bearing witness to the differend, that is, to 
such seemingly unresolvable disputes as the above. Each 
advocate points to a wrong that cannot be recognized in the 
other's perspective (for Lyotard such a perspective is a 
"regime of phrases" and such a wrong is a "damage"). Ly-
otard sets himself the task of rephrasing such oppositions. 
The first dialogue of Que peindre?, titled "Presence," centers 
on whether there is an irreducible dimension of presence in 
painting. The background of this discussion is the critique 
of the metaphysics (and, by implication, any aesthetics) of 
presence by Heidegger, Derrida, and others. "You" (a char-
acter with whom the reader may at first be tempted to iden-
tify) argues that there is no unmediated perception, espe-
cially in art, that everything we apprehend is surrounded by 
a halo of thought and language; and You adds in Hegelian 
fashion that art itself has become increasingly aware of this 
and has recently taken the inescapability of mediation as its 
theme. Yet the other participant in the discussion, "Him" 
(positioned initially as object rather than subject), asks that 
we pause for something like a phenomenological reflection 
here. Him attempts to evoke a sense of the event, the fact 
that something has taken place when we look at a painting 
that has interrupted the flow of discourse, external or inter-
nal. Another name for the event is presence. Him argues 
that the becoming-linguistic of recent art is not the sign of a 
Hegelian self-knowledge in which art realizes its true nature 
by dispensing with the myth of presence; it is rather simply 
a redistribution of social roles in which the work of com-
mentary is now assumed by artists without waiting for the 
contributions of critics and historians. Color is perhaps the 
most striking case of discursive interruption in painting. 
The possibility of speaking of color (by, for example, artic-
ulating a theory of color symbolism or considering the price 
and esteem of pigments in fifteenth-century Florence) does 
not alter the fact that it is presented to us. Being receptive to 
such presentation demands a kind of nonaction, which Him 
evokes with echoes of Heidegger's letting-be and explicit 
reference to the Zen thought of Dogen. Like these thinkers, 
Him (who seems increasingly to speak for Lyotard) recog-
nizes that speaking of the nondiscursive is paradoxical in 
the way that Hegel claimed the attempt to utter the immedi-
ate (in "Sense-Certainty") is paradoxical. One way of evad-
ing the paradox is to write or speak in a way that opens itself 
up to interruptions, a form Him calls "the painting of pres-
ence." The consequence would be that an artfully con-
structed ecphrasis could show by its phrasing how art inter-
rupts language. This seems to be the project of the ensuing 
dialogues in Que peindre? that explore variations on these 
themes in the work of three artists and in the phrasings to 
which they give rise. Similar strategies are at work in many 
of Lyotard's other writings, notably in about half of the es-
says collected in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. 
[See also Barthes; Baudrillard; Deleuze; Derrida; Fou-
cault; Lacan; Lyotard; Ricoeur; and Sartre.] 
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